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PROGRESS OR REGRESS : THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF HISTORY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A 
T the close of the preceding lecture I described the pres- A ent crisis in world history as a culture fighting for its 
life. T h e  decay of the ideals of democracy which I at- 
tempted to picture is not only the result of attacks from 
without but of boring from within. T h e  rights of man, the 
ideals of freedom, right, and justice are all bound up with 
a certain religious and metaphysical structure-an ideology 
if  you will-which much of the science and philosophy of our 
time has slowly but surely undermined. What ,  we may well 
ask, will be the fortunes of this fight? 
Now I am myself not wholly blind to the possibility that 
this degradation of democratic dogma, together with the 
degradation of science with which it is so closely connected, 
are symptoms of a permanent regress in our social and cul- 
tural life. I am not insensible to  the argument of Nietzsche 
that, evolutionary naturalism having destroyed the struc- 
ture with which these values have been bound up, the val- 
ues are gone also. I confess to  an uneasy feeling that the 
“Decline of the West,” of which Spengler writes, may be 
more real than we care to  think, and there sweeps over me 
at times a wave of historical pessimism which it is difficult 
to breast. In my heart of hearts I do  not really believe it, 
but it represents a possibility a t  least, which the more 
thoughtful man must face. Thus the topic of this present 
lecture : Progress or Regress.  
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In each of the preceding lectures I prefaced my discussion 
with some remarks on the r61e of the philosopher. T h e  
philosopher is, indeed, one who thinks a little more stub- 
bornly than other people. H e  is thus, also, one who remains 
of value for all times, for he rediscovers, and affirms ever 
anew, the things that must be taken for granted. But there 
is something more to  the philosopher than this. I should 
like to express this third function in the words of the Eng- 
lish philosopher Bosanquet. 
T h e  philosopher, as he defines him, is simply “one who 
does in the form of reflection what every thinking creature is 
doing in one way or another from birth to death.” Every 
liviizg creature seeks, of course, to  survive-to persist in his 
own being ; every sentient creature seeks the happiness which 
is the sign of his well-being; but in so fa r  as man is a think- 
ing being he seeks something more-namely, to  understand 
-to make his own life, and the world in which that life is 
lived, intelligible to  himself. 
This is what philosophers have always been doing. They  
have believed in a Divine Providence-a rational principle in 
history-one which overrules the passions and unreason of 
sinful men. They have believed in Progress-in some far-off 
divine event towards which the whole creation moves-an 
outcome which gives meaning and value to the historical 
process. This faith has been bound up with the other demo- 
cratic dogmas-belief in the primacy of reason and in the 
inalienable rights of man-bound up so closely, indeed, that 
i f  they do not hang together, they will hang separately. Thus 
it is that philosophy has always included a philosophy of 
history, and the problem of progress or regress, or of an 
eternal recurrence in human history, has always been central 
in the philosopher’s reflections. I t  is, then, to this third prob- 
lem of democratic ideology that we must turn our attention 
in the present lecture. 
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11. T H E  DECLINE OF WESTERN CULTURE. 
HISTORICAL PESSIMISM. 
A 
An outstanding feature of present-day thought is histori- 
cal pessimism. In  contrast to  the overweening optimism of 
the nineteenth century, with its dogma of necessary progress, 
there has been a widespread revulsion of feeling which has 
led to  exaggerated movements in the opposite direction. 
There  are  those who think of the historical movement in 
which we now find ourselves as a definite regress-not prog- 
ress. 
In this mood, and on the basis of these ideas, there are 
many also who have revived the ancient notion of cycles of 
history. I think you would be surprised to  find how many 
of the leading minds of the present day have abandoned 
completely the nineteenth century faith in progress and are 
coming to  feel that  if you look beneath the surface you will 
find the same old eternal recurrence. Of history Schopen- 
hauer wrote that it is merely “a succession of lies, robberies 
and murders. If you know one page you know it all.” And 
even the man of the street, face to face with the world as it 
is today, would say in his delightful slang, “Schopenhauer, 
you said a mouthful.” I said you would be surprised how 
many of the more thoughtful men of the day feel this may. 
You might also be surprised to  find that feeling deep down 
in your own heart. 
T h e  outstanding representative of this historical pessi- 
mism has been Oswald Spengler in his famous book T h e  
Declilze of the W e s t .  T h e  Preface to  the first edition is 
dated Munich, December 1917; it was written before the 
first Wor ld  W a r ,  but it so completely expressed the mood 
of Europe following upon the conclusion of that mar that  it 
may be considered a symbol of the post-war period. It is a 
11 8 Foundations of Democratic Dogma 
philosophy of history the main thesis of which, so fa r  as 
concerns our present interest, is the following. All cultures 
pass through three stages, the religious, the cultural, and 
that of civilization and science. T h e  first stage is the crea- 
tive period. I t  is then that the powers of a people are fresh 
and their imagination vivid. Under the driving force of a 
great faith they erect their temples and they build their 
states. A great culture is created and in this period of CUI- 
ture-of literature and art ,  of science and philosophy-a 
people lives and moves for many centuries. Finally this 
period passes over into that of science and civilization. T h e  
essential character of this period is neither faith nor culture, 
but rather utility and comfort. Ends sink into the back- 
ground and men become engrossed in the means of life. 
Science becomes chiefly invention, and for the goal of ulti- 
mate understanding men substitute that of manipulation and 
control. In  such a period a man who is not a scientist or an 
engineer is, as Spengler says, simply a fool. 
B 
This  philosophy of history is, of course, in a sense, noth- 
ing but the doctrine of the three stages of Comte, the re- 
ligious, the philosophical, and the scientific. Yes, but with a 
great difference: and it is just this difference which is of 
special significance for us. Comte’s doctrine was developed 
in the optimistic century of positivistic science and progress ; 
Spengler’s doctrine is the product of twentieth century pes- 
simism. For  Comte, and his fellows, science is the final 
stage of human perfection; we have now only to  go  on from 
glory to glory. F o r  Spengler, the period of science and 
civilization, of physical comforts and of mere adaptation, 
is, so to  speak, the beginning of the end, no matter how 
long the process of decline may be. 
This  historical pessimism found little response a t  first in 
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the American mind. T h e  historians simply laughed it off, 
and such criticism as was attempted barely scratched the 
surface, being confined to minor details rather than con- 
cerned with principles. But Spengler has, so to  speak, had 
his revenge. Wi th  the tremendous growth of interest in the 
philosophy of history of the last decade, and especially with 
the outbreak of a global war, there has been a great revival 
of interest. H e  has become the subject of many papers and 
dissertations in our university seminars. H i s  theory has 
again been riddled with criticisms, but one still has the un- 
easy feeling that the essential idea is indeed irrefutable, and 
that our civilization is going, for the time being a t  least, in 
the direction which he describes. In  any case, it  is this his- 
torical pessimism which our democratic way of life and the 
political philosophy it embodies must meet. Haro ld  Laski 
has said, truly, I believe, that “every political theory is a 
philosophy of history.” T h e  political theory of the nine- 
teenth century, the older liberalism of which men speak, was 
bound up with the dogma of necessary progress and the phi- 
losophy of history which it expresses. Much of the political 
philosophy of the twentieth century is characterized by the 
denial of this dogma. 
111. T H E  PHILOSOPHY O F  HISTORY AND T H E  
IDEA O F  PROGRESS. 
A 
I t  is quite commonly held that the belief in progress is 
wholly modern. Thus  J. B. Bury, the historian, in his book, 
T h e  Idea of Progress, traces it to  three sources, all recent 
-namely, the perfectionism of the period of the French 
Revolution, the evolutionism of Darwin, and the Hegelian 
idealism. But this is, to  say the least, an exaggeration, for, 
as Croce, the great philosopher of history, has shown, the 
belief in progress has its roots deep in the entire Christian 
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tradition. I t  is, indeed, only as such that its power over the 
Western mind can be understood. 
T h e  moral and political philosophy pictured in the pre- 
ceding lecture was itself bound up with a philosophy of his- 
tory, namely, the conception of Providence. God created 
man and in creation endowed him not only with certain ani- 
mal good, but also with certain inalienable rights which be- 
long to  him as man, as a rational being. Society and state 
are created as means for  the enhancement and conservation 
of these rights. T h e  civil order is based upon the natural or 
moral world-order. Wherever these basal human values are 
conserved and enhanced we have social and political prog- 
ress, wherever they are weakened or lost we have social 
and political degeneration or regress. 
Wi th  the gradual breaking up of this philosophical struc- 
ture went the providential philosophy of history, and for i t  
was substituted a doctrine of automatic o r  merely necessary 
natural evolution and progress. Instead of saying, “God’s 
in his Heaven, all’s right with the world,” men said “every- 
thing evolves, therefore all will be well.” Belief in auto- 
matic progress became, as Guyau, the French philosopher, 
pointed out, the modern man’s substitute for belief in Provi- 
dence. 
This modern idea of progress, naturally enough, became 
bound up ever more closely with the Darwiniaii theory of 
evolution and this idea became dominant in popular thought. 
Darwin himself sounded this note when, in concluding The 
Origirt of Species,  he wrote: “ A S  Natural  Selection works 
solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and 
mental endowments will tend towards perfection.” Just as 
fo r  the economic optimism of the nineteenth century, the 
principle of laksez. faire  was believed to  lead necessarily to  
economic justice or just distribution, so for this same opti- 
mism, evolution was supposed necessarily to imply progress. 
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All of which led Herber t  Spencer to  his famous dictum that 
“the law of progress is the most certain of all facts.” 
Now the significant thing for us is that no sooner had the 
belief in progress become tied up with naturalistic evolution 
than the belief itself began to  dissolve. There  is every 
reason that this should be so. T h e  attempt to deduce o r  to  
derive human moral progress from naturalistic evolution, 
the law of progress from the law of evolution, is an espe- 
cially egregious form of the naturalistic fallacy. 
Natural  selection is a wholly mechanical process. I t  does 
not work towards the good-it has no ends, either good o r  
bad-it works only towards adaptation and survival. “So 
careful of the type she seems, so careful of the single life,” 
wrote Tennyson. Actually, as we now see, “nature” is 
equally careless of the type. She cares no more for species 
than for individuals. F o r  evolution, so f a r  as science pic- 
tures it, one species is as good as another-the louse as good 
as the mastodon and both as good as man. 
You have most of you doubtless seen that marvellous 
scientific fantasy of Wal t  Disney’s “Fantasia,” put to  
Stravinski’s music-that picture of creative evolution, which, 
as the announcer said, is the story of evolution as the scien- 
tific imagination sees it. W h a t  did this story have to  say to  
you? Could there be a more perfect picture of complete 
meaninglessness and irrationality? T h e  futile monsters 
created only to  be wiped out again. T h e  meaningless pain 
upon pain, as the heat becomes intolerable and as, one by 
one, the palpitating masses of flesh and blood succumb to  
destruction and decay. Even Darwin, who was in the main 
optimistic, was a t  times overcome by the picture his scientific 
imagination presented to  him, and drew back aghast before 
its monstrous waste and irrationality. 
Leo Tolstoy was one of the first to  point the finger of 
scorn a t  the Victorian illusion that evolution is necessarily 
122 Foundations of Democratic Dogma 
progress. And he was wholly right. In his book, My Con- 
fession, he tells us how for a long time he was imposed upon 
by the illusion of progress and how he finally detected the 
fallacy that underlies it. T h e  “law of evolution” is, indeed, 
as Herbert  Spencer said, development from the simple to  
the complex-from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous 
-but it does not a t  all follow that the complex is the better. 
Tolstoy did not use the term but he pointed out the natural- 
istic fallacy which underlies the entire argument. T h e  loss 
of this illusion of progress is, I believe, one of the best 
things that could have happened to us, and men like Tolstoy, 
who have been instrumental in our disillusionment, have 
been our greatest benefactors. T h e  absurd notions of prog- 
ress which dominated the nineteenth century, which, as the 
historian Ferrero points out, “easily included both peace 
and war, justice and violence, steam plows and Lewis guns, 
Pasteur serum and melinite-” it is indeed well that these are 
gone. I t  is only when we recognize this fallacy for what it is 
that a justifiable belief in progress becomes possible. 
111. PROGRESS AS FACT AND BELIEF : T H E  CRITERION O F  
HUMAN PROGRESS 
A 
T h e  French philosopher Sore1 of whom I spoke in the 
preceding lecture wrote a book called The Illzisions of Prog- 
ress. I t  was, partly a t  least, the realization of these illusions 
which led him to  react so violently against the democratic 
ideal of gradual development in political and social institu- 
tions and to  espouse a revolutionary philosophy of force. 
In his even more famous book, Reflections on Violence,  this 
philosophy is expounded with great vigor. T h e  point I wish 
to  make here is that, having abandoned the belief in reason 
in nature and in man, he abandoned also the belief in prog- 
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ress which goes with it and turned to a philosophy of irra- 
tionalism and violence. 
This  disillusionment with the entire idea of progress is 
widespread and is closely bound up, I believe, with false 
ideas as t o  what human progress is and as to  the ground of 
belief in human progress. I t  was only natural that when 
these ideas failed us we should throw overboard the belief 
itself. T h e  older liberalism of the nineteenth century identi- 
fied progress largely with the development of modern science 
and invention and looked for the liberation and moralizing 
of man through these forces. Since they found the essence 
of progress in the mechanisms of life, it was only natural 
that  they came to  think of progress itself as a mechanical 
process. This  same liberalism found the ground for  belief in 
progress in evolution ; i t  was onlynatural that when they found 
that evolution did not, as they supposed, guarantee progress, 
they should throw over the entire idea of progress itself. 
Le t  us first, then, examine this idea of human progress 
itself. W h a t  is the criterion of such progress? W h a t  is in- 
volved in our saying of any period in human history, such 
as the nineteenth century, Yes, that was progress? 
First of all, such a judgment is always passed upon some 
process-on some more o r  less continuous change-let us say 
from the stagecoach to  the steam engine, and from the 
steam engine to  the automobile. Or, let us say, from the 
simple common law of early English custom to  the elaborate 
complexity of modern civil and constitutional law. T h e  judg- 
ment of progress always seems, moreover, to  involve three 
things : an elaboration or increase of complexity; some contin- 
uing identity of purpose throughout the change ; and, finally, 
some reference, however remote, to  ultimate ends and values 
realized in the process-ends and values which themselves 
do not progress but which are the measure of progress. 
This is what any genuine human progress would neces- 
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sarily be. As we say, t o  be progress a t  all, it must be moral 
progress. But in recent decades men have been inclined to 
find the criterion of progress elsewhere, in ideas more akin 
to our scientific and positivistic age. Just as the idea of 
science itself has been, as we have seen, divorced from the 
ultimate spiritual values with which it was first connected, 
and identified with the pure instrumentalism of means, so 
the idea of progress, so closely connected with the ideas of 
reason and of science, has also been divorced from them and 
become but a pittance of its former self. 
Progress, we are told by a recent writer, “is the discovery 
and application of the law of cause and effect. Real progress, 
says Sir William Ramsay, “is learning how better to  employ 
energy and better to effect its transformation.” Definitions 
of this type, of which there are many, are most enlightening, 
for they show beyond doubt the way our minds have been 
working, and make it quite clear that Spengler’s analysis of 
our culture is not without its element of truth. 
I t  is as though men said, “We will abandon all ideas of 
ultimate ends or values and think only in terms of means or 
instrumentalities. W e  will assume that we have progress 
wherever we increase the use of our discoveries of relations 
of cause and effect, whenever we learn better how to employ 
energy and better to effect its transformation.’’ But this, as 
we are coming to see, is sheer nonsense. Fo r ,  either it means 
that the accumulation of means is valuable, no matter what 
they are used for, than which there is clearly nothing more 
intrinsically senseless; o r  else it means the wholly un- 
grounded assumption that mere elaboration of the means of 
life works necessarily to  the good of life-the untruth of 
which history has completely shown. 
T h e  simple truth is that elaboration o r  complexity, is the 
only notion of progress that we can form if we start with 
such premises. Elaboration of the means of locomotion, in- 
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crease of population, development of more and more in- 
genious techniques may occur, but none of these is neces- 
sarily good in itself o r  leads necessarily to the good. In- 
deed the reverse may be the case. T h e  paradoxical law, 
that wealth may accumulate and men decay, is eminently 
applicable to  the conception of progress. T h e  only tenable 
criterion possible is one founded upon a conception of ob- 
jective intrinsic values. 
Such a criterion was attempted by the philosophical biolo- 
gist J. A. Thomson in his book, W h a t  is M a n ?  Every social 
change, he tells us, must run the gauntlet of successively 
higher criteria. “Is it sound physically, biologically, psycho- 
logically, socially?” T h e  principle is unhappily phrased, but, 
nevertheless, hits upon an essential character of any ade- 
quate criterion of progress. If progress in history cannot be 
determined by any single criterion whether technical, eco- 
nomic, biological, or even social and political, but only by a 
series of successively higher criteria, it is evident that in the 
very notion of progress itself is bound up the notion of an 
objective scale of values; and that this scale must be a sys- 
tem which transcends the changes it measures. 
B 
This, then, is the first step in our argument. T h e  only 
possible criterion of progress is a moral criterion. Such a 
criterion, however, can be found only in the essential nature 
of the Everlasting Man,  therefore in the absolute values 
that make him everlasting. Only in so fa r  as the democratic 
ideals of inalienable rights and absolute justice are realized 
is there genuine progress. But now we come to  the second 
step in the argument. Granted such a criterion, what are the 
actual facts of human history? Is it possible to  establish 
trends in history a t  all? And can we determine whether the 
trends are in this direction? 
126 Foundations of Democratic Dogma 
T h e  difficulties in the way of establishing such trends are 
not to be minimized. It is precisely these difficulties which, 
in par t  a t  least, have led many historians and students of 
human culture to abandon the idea. And yet the evidence 
for  human progress in this sense, if not such as to demon- 
strate it, is nevertheless, I believe, sufficient to make i t  highly 
probable. If it is not, as Herbert  Spencer would have us 
believe, the most certain of all facts, it is certainly a reason- 
able belief. 
T h e  difficulties in establishing moral progress as a fact 
are twofold. In  the first place, there is the difficulty of time. 
T h e  historic time, in which human progress is to  be detected, 
is to the time of cosmic and biological evolution as five 
minutes to  twenty-four hours. Wri ters  such as Havelock 
Ellis and Wiggam have made much of this fact, pointing 
out that, seen in the perspective of cosmic evolution, human 
evolution is too short  to  enable us to establish trends with 
any certainty. But there is a second difficulty. Progress as 
a belief, giving meaning to  our social and political life, must 
include the future also, and for  this no empirical evidence 
from history is possible. 
T h e  first difficulty is very real and ought not to  be mini- 
mized. Nevertheless, it is possible so to  formulate the prob- 
lem as to answer the question whether there has been moral 
progress or  not with reasonable certainty. I do  not believe 
that we can show that men are  happier than they mere in 
the beginnings of human time. W h a t  we call happiness is too 
subjective a thing in terms of which to  measure human value. 
I doubt whether we can show that individual men and 
women are  better, although that is, I think, more possible. 
But one thing we can show, I think, and that is that, more 
and more, there has been established in our laws and institu- 
tions the conditions for  the self-realization and dignity of 
man. Despite many signs to  the contrary a t  various times, 
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the general movement has been in the direction of “nobler 
modes of life, with sweeter manners and purer laws.” Even 
in so short a period of historical time as that of our Western 
world the fact stands out beyond cavil. One has only to read 
that classic of the subject, the chapter on “Mora l  Progress” 
in T. H. Green’s Prolegomena t o  Ethics, to be convinced of 
this truth. 
C 
T h e  historical evidence, then, when rightly approached 
and rightly interpreted, does seem to  indicate that there has 
been a moral progress in humanity, that  man has indeed, as 
we say, come a long way; and there seems to  be good hope 
that in the future he will tread greater paths still. W e  have 
a right to  say, with the historian Ferrero, “the progress in 
which we had perhaps too readily believed is not altogether 
an illusion.” 
But evidence for progress in the past, though it may give 
us hope for the future, does not give us a belief sufficient to 
afford a basis for man’s moral and political life. A law of 
progress, such as that of which Spencer spoke, must be more 
than a pious hope; it must be a reasonable belief, and no 
belief is reasonable that is not based on some kind of evi- 
dence. This  is the second difficulty in the way of any belief 
in necessary progress. 
There  is obviously no empirical or historical evidence for 
a law of progress which includes the future also. No one can 
say with any certainty that the progress which we seem to 
see in the past will not begin to slacken tomorrow, or per- 
haps has already begun to halt, and we be unaware of it. 
W e  may be going back-there may be a degradation not only 
of democratic dogma but of human life itself. True ,  but no 
one can say for a certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow. 
So f a r  as empirical evidence is concerned there is no evidence 
that today is not the last day of mortal life on this globe. 
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T h e  point is that there is no empirical evidence for any uni- 
versal law-for any principle that applies to  the future as 
well as the past. 
If we believe in what is called the principle of the uni- 
formity of nature-that everything that happens in the fu- 
ture will have a cause, or, as we say, be governed by law, it 
is not because we have any empirical evidence tha t  this will 
be so;  it is rather because we know that, if it is not so, physi- 
cal science or knowledge is impossible. T h e  situation is in 
principle the same in the case of the postulate or law of 
progress. If we believe that progress is necessary, it  is only 
because we know that, if it is not, history in the sense of 
meaningful process is impossible. As Henry Adams has 
said, the belief in progress is “the lifeblood of history!” 
T h e  sub-title of this lecture is the philosophy of history, 
and with the foregoing statement I come to the essentially 
philosophical aspect of my general thesis-and what, to  my 
mind, is the essentially logical foundation for the dogma of 
progress. 
Belief in progress is the lifeblood of history-which is the 
same thing as saying that it is a necessary postulate without 
which there is no history, and no history can be written. 
NIore and more historians are coming to see that this is so. 
Without this postulate we have merely chronology, not his- 
tory. T h e  reason for this seems to  be clear. T h e  essence 
of history is interpretation-the discovery of the meaning in 
temporal events. If there is no meaning to tie them to- 
gether, we have merely brute succession o r  chronology. 
Now it is quite clear, I think, that there can be no meaning 
without value movement, forward or backward. T h e  French 
Revolution is an historical event, but what makes it such an 
event is its meaning. FJ7e might interpret i t  as a stage in the 
development of modern democracy, as most historians do, 
or we might interpret it as a regress, but either one or the 
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other it must be, otherwise it is a meaningless collection of 
unrelated happenings and not history. There  could be, of 
course, history, in a certain sense, based upon the postulate 
of regress ; there might be a story of things continually going 
to the dogs. But, after all, that seems impossible. As the no- 
tion of the good is positive and that of evil a negation of 
the good, so the notion of regress has meaning only in rela- 
tion to  the more ultimate positive conception of progress. 
Progress is then, after all, the lifeblood of history; without 
that  postulate history is “sound and fury signifying noth- 
ing.” 
I am well aware, of course, that all this, to be convincing, 
requires much more development than I am able to  give it in 
this context. I have done this elsewhere, otherwise I should 
not venture thus to  dogmatize here. I should have to  dis- 
cuss the entire question of the methodology of history. I 
should have to point out how on the basis of the principle 
of the decentralization of the sciences, scientists themselves 
are coming to  see the different material of history and how 
it must therefore differ in method from the physical sciences. 
I should have, finally, to  show that history, as a science from 
which, as we say, lessons for man can be learned, must in- 
volve interpretation, and interpretation is possible only in 
terms of the ends and values of men. 
All this must, however, be left for  your own thought. In- 
stead I shall merely emphasize again my main contention. 
Biologists, including Darwin himself, have told us that the 
long course of organic evolution justifies faith in further 
progress. By itself it does nothing of the kind. W e  have in- 
deed no evidence that progress, as understood by organic 
evolution, is now over, but we also have no evidence that it is 
not. But  human history is another matter. T h e  long course 
of human history does justify the belief in further progress, 
for without tha t  belief history itself does not exist. As one 
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of the wisest students of history has said, “To draw from 
history the conclusion that it must always remain as it has 
been, is insincere. For  without any inner progress, there is 
no history.” 
D 
Le t  us hear then the sum of the whole matter. Belief in 
human progress is a matter of faith, but it is what the philos- 
opher calls a reasonable faith. I t  is not merely the healthy 
optimism of West ern-more especially Ame r ican-cul ture, 
it is the faith of rational men when they have contemplated 
all the possibilities. 
I t  has been the fashion recently to  poke fun a t  this faith as 
expressed in poetic form by the nineteenth century Victorian 
poet, Alfred Tennyson. When he cries, 
Yet  I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs 
sceptics want to  know what that increasing purpose is and 
how he knows it. Still more are they disposed to laugh when 
in the same poem he cries, 
I, the heir of all the ages in the foremost ranks of time. 
Ah, there we have it, they say, that conceit of man which 
reached colossal proportions in the Victorian period-this 
measuring all the ranks of time in terms of the human. 
But, believe me, my friends, all this laughter is cheap and 
not worthy of thoughtful men. T h e  plain man a t  least will 
not be laughed out of this fundamental belief. I n  this re- 
spect he is often more philosophical than many of the more 
sophisticated intellectuals. His homely wisdom tells him 
truly that we must either go forward or backward, we can- 
not stand still; but this wisdom tells him also that anything 
else than forward movement in the story of human endeavor 
is as rationally inconceivable as it is morally intolerable. 
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Belief in progress is, indeed, a faith with logical founda- 
tions. But it is easy to  lose that faith if  we keep our eyes on 
the surface of things. In times such as these we may feel 
like crying out in scorn against this “superstition of prog- 
ress,” as Tolstoy called it, with which we have veiled the 
realities of life. Tolstoy tells us that when, during his stay 
in Paris, he went to  an execution and “saw the head severed 
from the body and both falling separately with a thud into 
a box, I understood with my whole being that no theories of 
progress could either justify o r  cover up that deed.” H o w  
much more must men and women everywhere be crying out 
in anguish a t  the present moment against this superstition. 
I am not insensible to  the element of justice in this cry. 
Nor do I a t  all wonder that, as the booksellers tell us, innu- 
merable people have been turning to  Tolstoy’s novel, W a r  
alzd Peace, that  greatest of all historical novels, and con- 
taining also a significant philosophy of history. They  seek 
enlightenment in the historical confusion of our day and 
Tolstoy does indeed tell us many things which may help to  
understanding and clarification. 
Time and again, he emphasizes the exceeding difficulty 
which human beings experience in seeking to understand the 
meaning of contemporary events. T h e  more catastrophic 
the upheaval, the more confused the reaction thereto. T o  
conceal our bewilderment, he tells us, publicists and leaders 
invent the most obscure, intangible, and general abstrac- 
tions, and call them “the aim and movement of humanity.” 
T h e  most usual virtues identified with one’s own cause are 
freedom, enlightenment, equality, progress, civilization, and 
culture. Actually, says Tolstoy, the cause of human events 
is not these ideas but the recurrent will to  power. 
Tolstoy has, I think, much to  teach us here. Unless we 
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realize fully the element of rationalization involved in all 
justification of war-the inevitable misuse of democratic 
ideals which the passions of war engender-unless we realize 
fully the recurrent elements in history and the r61e which 
the will to power inevitably plays in all historic movements, 
we shall not see truly the true elements of progress in his- 
tory. ViTe shall lose our faith in progress, and our loss this 
time may, for many of us, be irrecoverable. But because men 
take these great ideas of freedom, enlightenment, and equal- 
ity in vain, because in their rationalizations they intoxicate 
both themselves and us, it does not a t  all follow that they 
are not really the “aim and movement of humanity.” 
Tolstoy himself came later to  see the element of truth in 
this view. W a r  and Peace was written while he was still un- 
der the influence of Schopenhauer. W e  should remember, 
what is not sufficiently pointed out, that Tolstoy lost his 
faith in false notions of progress only to  recover it in the 
form of the more ancient doctrine of Providence. H e  lost 
his illusions only to find that which was real behind the 
illusions. 
IV. HISTORY AND COSVIOLOGY: PROGRESS AND THE DEGRADA- 
TION O F  ENERGY 
A 
I hold, then, that faith in human progress is a justifiable 
faith. When stripped of its illusions, it is seen not only to 
be borne out by the facts of history, but also to be the sine 
qua izon of there being any intelligible history a t  all. The  
story of man is, however, we are told, but five minutes in 
the long twenty-four hours of the story of the cosmos. Hu-  
man history may give us the impression of a progress and a 
gain, but physical science tells a different story. Science tells 
us that the universe itself is “running down.” In the five 
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minutes of human history man may have many thrills and 
many elations, but after all it  is the twenty-four hours that 
count and the end of that period is cosmic death. 
This  is the final challenge to  our philosophical optimism. 
T h e  postulate of a law of progress is, indeed, the lifeblood 
of history, as Henry  Adams said, but, as he also tells us in 
his vivid language, “history and sociology are now gasping 
for  breath.” T h e  acceptance of the principle of the degra- 
dation of energy, with its implications of a universe running 
down, means that there can be no progress-no increase and 
conservation of value in any ultimate sense-and, therefore, 
that the postulate, upon which not only our moral effort but 
all historical interpretation of moral effort is based, is an il- 
lusion. Many share with him this position. According to 
this law, the energy of the universe is running down like a 
clock and we can predict, if not with absolute certainty, yet 
with a high degree of probability, that  in the future, f a r  dis- 
tant t o  be sure, the heat radiated from the sun will have 
become dissipated throughout the universe, our earth will 
become cold, the conditions of life will disappear, and life 
itself, with all its fret, but still more with all its values and 
ideals, will vanish without a trace. W e  are  even told, by 
Mr. Russell for instance, that we must “build our lives on 
the firm foundations of despair,” a despair which such a 
view is supposed to  make inevitable to  any sensitive mind. 
T h e  issue raised by such considerations may seem to  many 
very remote and unreal, but it is really not, and such ideas 
have had more effect on men’s philosophy of life in general, 
and on their attitude towards democratic dogma, than many 
suppose. Fo r  myself, I do  not believe that we must build our 
lives on this firm foundation of despair. I think the cosmic 
foundations are quite different. 
First  of all, I do  not believe that the calculations of physi- 
cal science lead to  any such conclusions regarding the future 
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of the physical universe, and many physicists and astron- 
omers agree with this view. I think it could be shown that 
these supposed deductions were based upon a conception of 
the space-time world of physics which has been completely 
altered by our modern conceptions of relativity. W h a t  is 
more to the point, I think it can be shown, and indeed I have 
shown elsewhere, that such propositions about the cosmos, 
whether to  the effect the world is building up or running 
down, can, by their very nature, be neither empirically 
proved nor disproved-a view that is also held by many 
physicists. Obviously, I cannot go into these highly technical 
matters here, but I may be permitted to suggest that they 
have not yet been truly evaluated by popular science. In any 
case it is not the point which I chiefly want to make here. 
This objection to  the belief in progress is often met in the 
following way. I t  is obvious, as Professor Bury tells us, that 
progress would be valueless if there were cogent reasons for 
supposing that the time a t  the disposal of humanity is likely 
to reach a limit in the near future, but he thinks that there is 
no incompatibility between the law of progress and the law 
of degradation, because the possibility of progress is guaran- 
teed, pragmatically a t  least, by the high probability, based 
on mathematical calculations, of a virtually infinite time to 
progress in. 
This is doubtless true, but it is very questionable whether 
such a guarantee would satisfy our moral reason. X o  matter 
how long it would be guaranteed, actually it would ulti- 
mately be an illusion. Fo r  the reality would be a steady 
diminution in value ending finally in universal death. T h e  
certainty of ultimate failure would dwarf into insignificance 
our temporary successes. Fo r  there is one thing that would 
be forever irrational and intolerable no matter how long it 
were put off-namely, that humanity with all its intellectual 
and moral toil will vanish without a trace, and that not even 
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a memory will be left in any mind. T h e  drafts which we 
make upon moral reason cannot be estimated in years, how- 
ever loosely we play with them. T h e  world bank is the one 
bank of which it may be said that if it is ultimately insolvent 
it has always been so. 
B 
I hope it is clear in what direction this argument is tend- 
ing. Any real faith in human progress, like faith in the other 
elements of democratic dogma, must be based upon much 
more solid foundations than any such merely pragmatic con- 
siderations. Like these other elements, it is bound up with a 
theological and philosophical structure that has, indeed, en- 
dured for a thousand years, and without this structure, this 
belief, like the others, the belief in reason and in natural 
rights, cannot endure. 
An increasing number of historians and philosophers are 
coming to  see this fact. Disillusioned with the illusory opti- 
mism of the nineteenth century, based as it was on a false 
conception of progress, they are now confessing that the 
idea of progress itself is intelligible only in terms of the theo- 
logical and philosophical structure on which it originally 
rested. Having lost faith in God and the Divine Reason- 
and faith in the providential control of the events of time 
by an over-ruling Providence-we are relapsing into the 
essentially static and repetitive view of the time-process 
typical of antiquity and of the East. This is the significance 
of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence which raises its 
head in so many quarters. This is the significance of the 
historical pessimism which has flooded the twentieth century. 
Men have tried to  retain this faith without the world view 
with which it was bound up. They  have tried to  transfer it 
from its ancient base to the doctrine of evolutionary natural- 
ism. But such an attempt is as fatuous as the attempt to  
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graf t  our Christian morals on evolutionary naturalism, as 
Nietzsche clearly saw. I should like to read you a passage 
which expresses admirably this fatuous modern mood. I t  is 
written by Clarence Day whose play “Life With  Father,” 
many of you doubtless have enjoyed. I t  appeared in an 
article entitled “This Simian World,” published in Harpers  
Magazine in 1920. 
“They tell me,” he cries, “that our race may be an acci- 
dent in a meaningless universe; living its brief life uncared 
for on this dark cooling s ta r ;  but even so, and all the more, 
what marvelous creatures we are! W h a t  fairy story, what 
tale from the Arabian Nights of the jinns, is a hundredth 
part  as wonderful as the true fairy story of the simians? 
“And it is so much more heartening too, than the tales we 
invent. A universe capable of giving birth to such accidents 
is, blind or not, a good world to live in, even if  not the 
best. W e  have won o w  way up against odds. W e  have 
made this our planet. I t  stirs me to  feel myself part  of our 
racial adventure. 
“ I t  is a venture that may never be noticed by gods. I t  may 
lead to  no eternal reward in itself. God, o r  no God, we be- 
long to  a race that has made a long march and in the future 
may travel on greater roads still.” 
I am not sure whether to take this seriously o r  to  see in it 
a conscious parody of the modern mood. T h e  writer, it 
seems to me, must have had his tongue in his cheek. H e  
seems much too clever and understanding to do otherwise. 
But I am not so sure, for there are many who talk in this 
way. If, however, our race is indeed an accident in a mean- 
ingless universe, then this fairy story of the simians is not 
wonderful. I t  is ghastly; as ghastly as the story of creative 
evolution pictured in Farztasia-a fantasy indeed, but one 
possible only to the modern irrationalist. 
At the beginning of these lectures I spoke of the three 
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democratic dogmas which, if they do not hang together, will 
hang separately. N o t  very long ago, in a popular lecture 
before the University of Wisconsin, President Glenn Frank 
seemed to  suggest that all these dogmas of the old liberal- 
ism, as he called them, must be discarded. Especially the 
dogma of automatic progress must be abandoned by the new 
liberalism. Of progress he says, “ I t  is not automatic. I t  is 
a difficult achievement. I t  is a car to  ride in, a campaign to 
be carried on by prophets, pioneers, and teachers.” Now 
with the call to  discard the illusions of progress I have no 
quarrel as this lecture has abundantly shown. Progress is in- 
deed not automatic-it is not that mechanical thing conjured 
up by science, falsely so called. But neither is it merely a car 
to ride in, a campaign for prophets and teachers. T h a t  also 
is a travesty on the nature of our faith. If progress exists 
a t  all, it cannot depend wholly on man. T o  be genuine prog- 
ress a t  all it must have its ground in a reason that transcends 
man. T h e  meaning of events in space and time lies outside 
space and time. 
C 
And so with this somewhat strong language I bring my 
third and final lecture to  a close. W e  have been examining 
together the logical foundations of democratic dogma, that 
great structure or ideology with which our democratic way 
of life is bound up. In these lectures I have tried to  be as 
objective as the subject matter and my own temperament 
would permit. Perhaps in these closing paragraphs you will 
allow me to lapse into the hortatory. 
Some of you may recall a recent play by Saroyan called 
The Time of Your Life. In the play every now and then 
appears a curious old Arab workman who mutters, “No 
foundations, no foundations. All the way down.” One can 
scarcely wonder a t  this comment upon our American life. 
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T h e  scene is laid in a water-front dive. As the play un- 
rolls with its medley of meaningless and futile characters- 
the cynical and disillusioned protagonist of the play, end- 
lessly drinking champagne and endlessly commenting on the 
meaninglessness of life; the barkeep and the prostitutes, the 
cynical visitors from the upper crust and the even more cyni- 
cal and brutal police; the crazy youth endlessly trying to  
break the juke box ( the  play ends with his final triumph and 
with the mechanical waving of the Flag by the machine and 
the equally mechanical playing of the Star Spangled Ban- 
ner)-as the play unrolls, I repeat, we do  not wonder that 
this strange old man mutters and mutters, “NO foundations, 
no foundations. All the way down.” N o r  do  we wonder 
that the playwright makes this the symbol of his play. 
No foundations for our American democracy? I do not 
believe it. There  are foundations but they are very deep- 
so deep in fact that  we ourselves are  often unaware of them. 
Bu t  perhaps one must go all the way down to  find them. 
Perhaps it is only the shock of a great war  and the realizing 
sense of the frailty of our superficial mechanical and tech- 
nological superstructures that  will help us again to realize 
these foundations. However that may be, these foundations 
are very deep and only the deepest thought can reveal them 
for  what they are. 
And since I have begun to be hortatory, perhaps I may as 
well go all the way and quote from Holy Wr i t  itself. T h e  
words are  from St. Paul, who was not only a great Apostle 
but a great philosopher. ‘Whatsoever  things are  true, what- 
soever things are  lovely, whatsoever things are of good re- 
port, i f  there be any virtue, i f  there be any praise, think on 
these things.” 
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